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Mean-field games of optimal stopping:
a relaxed solution approach
Géraldine Bouveret ∗ Roxana Dumitrescu † Peter Tankov ‡
Abstract
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to
exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending
on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game. We place
ourselves in the framework of relaxed optimal stopping, which amounts to looking for
the optimal occupation measure of the stopper rather than the optimal stopping time.
This framework allows us to prove the existence of a relaxed Nash equilibrium and the
uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent under mild assumptions.
Further, we prove a rigorous relation between relaxed Nash equilibria and the notion
of mixed solutions introduced in earlier works on the subject, and provide a criterion,
under which the optimal strategies are pure strategies, that is, behave in a similar
way to stopping times. Finally, we present a numerical method for computing the
equilibrium in the case of potential games and show its convergence.
Keywords: Mean-field games, optimal stopping, relaxed solutions, infinite-dimensional
linear programming
AMS: 91A55, 91A13, 60G40
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study a large-population stochastic differential game of
optimal stopping, where each agent finds the optimal time to exit the game by solving an
optimal stopping problem with instantaneous reward function depending on the density of
the state processes of agents still present in the game. To motivate the mean-field game
(MFG) framework, we first provide a formulation with a finite number of agents. Assume
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that each agent i = 1, 2, ..., N has a private state process X i, whose dynamics is given by
the stochastic differential equation (SDE),







where the Brownian motions W i, i = 1, . . . , N are independent.

















δXit (dx)1t≤τ i ,
where τ i represents the optimal stopping time of the agent i. Agents have the same state
process coefficients and objective functions, and the optimal stopping problems are coupled
only through the empirical measure mN . Since the objective functions are coupled, it is
natural to look for Nash equilibria.
Stochastic differential games with a large number n of players are rarely tractable. The
MFG approach amounts to looking for a Nash equilibrium in the limiting regime, when the
number of players n goes to infinity. Following this approach, we study the MFG of optimal
stopping, which can be seen as an infinite-agent version of the above game. In this approach,












dXt = µ(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt.
Then, given τm,x the optimal stopping time for the agent with initial condition x, and the
initial measure m0, we look for the flow of measures (mt)0≤t≤T such that
mt(A) =
∫
m0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; τm,x > t], A ∈ B(Rd), t ∈ [0, T ]. (1.1)
Note that in (1.1), the probability is not a conditional but joint probability. A solution
(Nash equilibrium) of the MFG problem is the flow of measures (mt)0≤t≤T , which is the fixed
point of the mapping defined by the right-hand side of (1.1).
In this paper, we prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium for the MFG problem and
the uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent. To this aim, we use the
relaxed solution approach, which converts the stochastic optimal stopping problem into a
linear programming problem over a space of measures. The decision variable is no longer
the optimal stopping time, but rather the distribution of the killed state process.
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Introducing relaxed solutions facilitates existence proofs: the existence is proven by using
Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem. The relaxed solutions are related to the mixed strate-
gies introduced in (Bertucci 2017), and we establish a rigorous relation between the two.
Finally, we propose an implementable numerical scheme for computing a Nash equilibrium
in the case of potential games, and show its convergence. An application of these results to
a resource-sharing problem will be developed in a companion paper.
MFG theory has been introduced by P.-L. Lions and J.-M. Lasry in a series of papers
(Lasry & Lions 2006a, Lasry & Lions 2006b, Lasry & Lions 2007) using an analytic approach
and studied independently at about the same time by (Huang, Caines & Malhamé 2006).
Later on, a probabilistic approach has been developed in a series of papers by Carmona, De-
larue, and their co-authors (Carmona & Delarue 2013b, Carmona & Delarue 2013a, Carmona
& Delarue 2018, Carmona, Delarue & Lacker 2016, Lacker 2015) and so on.
The analytic method consists in finding the Nash equilibria through a coupled system
of nonlinear partial differential equations: a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (backward
in time), which describes the optimal control problem of the representative agent when the
distribution µ is given, and a Kolmogorov-type equation (forward in time) which describes
the evolution of the density under the optimal control. In the probabilistic approach, the
system of PDEs is replaced by a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential
equations of McKean-Vlasov type.
MFGs of optimal stopping have been considered in the literature only very recently,
and our understanding of this type of games remains limited. (Nutz 2018) considers a
MFG problem where the agents interact through the proportion of players that have already













There, the process r creates an incentive for the agent to stay in the game, while the possibil-
ity of default at a random time θ creates an incentive to leave. The distribution of θ depends
on the proportion ρt of players who have already stopped in such a way that the departure
of other agents creates an incentive for the agent under consideration to leave as well (this
type of game is known as preemption game). In a similar spirit but with greater generality,
(Carmona, Delarue & Lacker 2017) consider MFGs of timing, whose formulation is moti-
vated by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous time setting. As in (Nutz 2018), the
payoff of each agent depends on the proportion of players who have already stopped, and the
departure of players creates an additional incentive for the players still in the game to leave
as well. Both papers ((Nutz 2018) and (Carmona et al. 2017)) adopt a purely probabilistic
approach.
In contrast to these two references, (Bertucci 2017) studies a MFG of optimal stopping,
which is similar to the one considered in this paper, i.e. where the interaction takes place
through the density of states of agents remaining in the game, rather than the proportion
of players that have already stopped. In this reference and in our paper, the departure
of players creates an incentive for the players still in the game to stay, a type of behavior
known as ’war of attrition’, which is characteristic of resource-sharing problems. In (Bertucci
3
2017) the state process has constant coefficients and evolves in a bounded domain, and the
MFG of optimal stopping is solved through a coupled system of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
variational inequality and a Fokker-Planck equation.
(Bertucci 2017) makes a number of significant contributions to the literature. In par-
ticular, he provides an example of non-existence of Nash equilibrium with pure strategies in
optimal stopping MFG, and introduces the notion of mixed strategies in this context, for
which existence may be recovered. However, the existence proofs in this paper are not fully
clear to us.1 To clarify the existence question and solve the MFG of optimal stopping prob-
lem in greater generality (with variable coefficients and in unbounded domains), we adopt,
in this paper, a completely different approach, based on the relaxed solution technique.
The approach of relaxed solutions/controls is a relatively popular method of compactifica-
tion of stochastic control problems to establish existence of solutions, which comes in several
different flavors. In, e.g., (El Karoui, Huu Nguyen & Jeanblanc-Picqué 1987) and a number
of other papers, the authors reformulate the control problem as a relaxed controlled martin-
gale problem. A similar approach is used by (Lacker 2015) in the context of (standard) MFG.
In the second approach, especially popular for infinite-horizon and ergodic control problems,
the control problem is reformulated as a linear programming problem on the space of mea-
sures, and one looks for the joint occupation density of the state process and the control.
We refer the reader to, e.g., (Buckdahn, Goreac & Quincampoix 2011) and (Stockbridge
et al. 1990), for a link between these two formulations. The literature on relaxed solutions
for individual optimal stopping problems is quite limited. (Cho & Stockbridge 2002) pro-
pose a linear programming formulation for the infinite-horizon optimal stopping of a Markov
diffusion process, using two measures: the occupation measure of the process and the joint
distribution of the stopping time and the stopped process. (Helmes & Stockbridge 2007)
extend this result to processes with singular components such as reflected diffusions. In
contrast to these two references, in our paper we propose a different formulation based only
on the occupation measure of the process killed at the stopping time. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first paper which uses relaxed solutions in order to solve optimal
stopping problems of mean-field type.
The literature on numerical schemes for MFG is well developed in the case of MFG with
regular controls (see e.g. (Benamou & Carlier 2015)), but very little is known in the case of
MFG with optimal stopping. In the latter case (Bertucci 2018) proposes an algorithm, which
works only under the assumption that the instantaneous reward function is strictly monotonic
with respect to the measure, which is quite restrictive for applications. We propose instead
a different algorithm, which allows to consider the case of a non-strictly monotonic reward
function.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we present the model and give
the mean-field formulation of the problem. In Section 3, we introduce the relaxed formulation
of the single-agent optimal stopping problem and establish the existence of a relaxed solution.
1To be precise, the weak convergence of the flow mε established in the proof of existence of a mixed
solution in both stationary and parabolic cases (Theorems 1.6 for the stationary case and Theorem 2.1 for




In Section 4, we study the relaxed optimal stopping problem in the MFG context and give
conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
value. In Section 5, we establish the relation between the relaxed and strong formulation
of both single-agent and MFG optimal stopping problems. Finally, in Section 6, we present
the numerical algorithm and provide convergence results.
2 The model
We fix a terminal time horizon T < ∞, and introduce a possibly unbounded open domain
O ⊆ Rd on which the state processes of the agents will evolve. The space of bounded positive
measures on O will be denoted by M(O), and the space of probability measures on O will
be denoted by P(O). In the sequel, any element x ∈ Rd will be identified to a column vector
with i-th component xi and Euclidian norm ||x||. Similarly, for any matrix A ∈ Rd×K we
denote by ||A|| its Euclidian norm.
N-players game formulation Consider N agents whose states X i, i = 1, . . . , N follow
the diffusion-type dynamics









i ∈ O, (2.1)
where the K-dimensional Brownian motions W i, i = 1, . . . , N are independent and the
coefficients µ and σ satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (X-SDE). The coefficients µ : [0, T ]×O 7→ Rd and σ : [0, T ]×O 7→ Rd×K
are assumed to be Lipschitz continuous in the second variable, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ] and
bounded.




E[||X it ||p] <∞, for all p ≥ 1.
We denote by L the infinitesimal generator of this process




with ∇Xf := (∂x1f, ..., ∂xdf)>, HXf the Hessian matrix of f with respect to x and Tr the
trace operator.














where ρ > 0 is a discount factor, f̃ : [0, T ]×O×M(O)→ R is the running reward function,






δXit (dx)1t≤τ i∧τ iO , (2.2)
with τ i a stopping time with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions of
all agents, corresponding to agent i and τ iO the exit time from the domain O of agent i. The
assumptions on f̃ will be specified later, and g is assumed to belong to C1,2([0, T ]×O) and
has derivatives of order 1 in t and of orders 1 and 2 in x of polynomial growth in x uniformly
in t. Letting f(t, x, µ) = e−ρt(f̃(t, x, µ)− ρg(t, x) + ∂g
∂t
+ Lg), the optimal stopping problem











We now formulate the notion of Nash equilibrium for the optimal stopping game with
N players. To this purpose, let T be the set of stopping times with respect to the filtration
generated by the Brownian motions of all agents, taking values between 0 and T . Given
a strategy vector τ := (τ 1, τ 2, ..., τN)∈ T N and an individual strategy σ∈ T , let [τ−i, σ]
indicate the strategy vector that is obtained from τ by replacing τ i, the strategy of player i,
with σ.
Definition 2.1 (Nash EquilibriumN -players game). A strategy vector τ := (τ 1, τ 2, ..., τN)∈ T N
is called a Nash equilibrium for the N players game, if for every i ∈ {1, 2, .., N} and every
σ∈ T , we have
J iN(τ) ≥ J iN([τ−i, σ]),
where, for each θ∈ T N ,








where mNt is given by (2.2) with τ
i replaced by θi, for each i.
MFG formulation In the limit of a large number of agents, we expect, from the law of
large numbers, that the empirical measure mNt converges to a deterministic limiting distri-
bution mt for each t ∈ [0, T ]. The problem of each agent therefore consists in finding the
optimal stopping time in the filtration generated by the individual noise of this agent only,
and it is sufficient to work on a probability space supporting a single Brownian motion.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space supporting a standard K-dimensional Brownian
motion W . We denote by FW the natural filtration of W completed with the sets of measure
6







where we write Xx· as a shorthand for X
(0,x)
· . As intimated in the introduction, the first
step of the MFG approach consists in solving the following optimal stopping problem for the
agent
max







where T W ([0, T ]) is the set of FW -stopping times with values in [0, T ] and τxO ≡ τ
(0,x)
O is the
exit time from the domain O of this agent with initial value x. Then, given the optimal
stopping time (solution of the problem (2.4)) for the agent with initial condition x, τm,x,




m0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; τm,x ∧ τxO > t], A ∈ B(O), t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.5)
In other words, the solution of the optimal stopping MFG problem is the flow of measures
(mt)0≤t≤T , which is the fixed point of the mapping defined by the right-hand side of (2.5).
In the sequel, such solution will be called a pure solution. As shown in (Bertucci 2017), pure
solutions for optimal stopping MFG problems do not always exist, and for this reason in the
sequel we shall consider relaxed solutions. A relaxed solution is close in spirit to the mixed
solution introduced in (Bertucci 2017), precise relationship between the two notions will be
established later in the paper.
3 Relaxed formulation of the single-agent optimal stop-
ping problem
The relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem consists in finding the occupation
measure of the representative agent rather than the stopping time. We first provide a relaxed
formulation of the standard optimal stopping problem in this section and then move to the
relaxed formulation of the MFG problem in the following one. First, we introduce the
necessary notations.
Let V be the space of flows of (signed) bounded measures on O: (mt(·))0≤t≤T ∈ V is
such that: for every t ∈ [0, T ], mt is a (signed) bounded measure on O, for every A ∈ B(O),




Omt(dx) dt < ∞. To each flow m ∈ V ,
we associate a signed measure on [0, T ] × O defined by µ(dt, dx) := mt(dx) dt. The space





function f continuous and bounded) is a locally convex Hausdorff topological space (see e.g.
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(Varadarajan 1961)).
Consider the optimal stopping problem
max







In this section we study a relaxed version of this optimal stopping problem, where the
process X starts with an initial distribution m∗0 ∈ P(O) instead of a fixed value, and which
is formulated in terms of flows of measures rather than stopping times. We let m̄t denote
the distribution of the process X, started with the initial distribution m∗0 and killed at the




m∗0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; τxO > t].
We impose the following minimal assumption on the reward function f . We shall see below
in Corollary 3.4 that this assumption is sufficient for the problem to be well defined, but
stronger assumptions will be imposed for existence of solution.




(f(t, x))−m̄t(dx) dt <∞,
where ()− denotes the negative part.
The previous assumption was not sufficient to guarantee that the integral in (3.2) is well
defined.
Definition 3.1 (Relaxed optimal stopping problem). For a given initial distribution m∗0 ∈
P(O), the relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem (3.1) consists in finding the




f(t, x)mt(dx) dt, (3.2)
over m̂ ∈ A(m∗0), where the set A(m∗0) ⊆ V contains all flows of positive bounded measures












m̂t(dx) dt ≥ 0, (3.3)
for all u ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×O) such that u ≥ 0 and ∂u
∂t
+ Lu is bounded on [0, T ]×O.
8
The rest of this section is devoted to the solution of the relaxed optimal stopping problem.
A precise connection with the strong (classical) formulation of the optimal stopping problem
will be established in Section 5. To gain some intuition about this definition right away,
remark that for a stopping time τ ∈ T W ([0, T ]), we can introduce the occupation measure










f(t, y)mxt (dy) dt.









(t, y)mt(dy) dt = E[u(τ ∧ τxO ∧ T,Xτ∧τxO∧T )] ≥ 0.
In Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5, we study the properties of the set A(m∗0). First note that this set
is clearly nonempty since it contains the flow mt(dx) ≡ 0. To proceed, we need a regularity
assumption on the coefficients µ and σ. We distinguish two cases depending on the type of
boundary of O.
Assumption 3 (X-PDE). The coefficients µ and σ are such that for every C∞ bounded





(t, x) = g(t, x) (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O, u(T, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ O, (3.4)
has a C1,2 solution u on [0, T ]×O such that ∂u
∂x
has a polynomial growth in x, uniformly in
t, and such that one of the following two conditions holds:
i. The boundary of O is unattainable: for all x ∈ O, τxO > T a.s.
ii. The solution u belongs to C([0, T ]×O) and satisfies u(t, x) = 0 for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×∂O.
Remark 3.2. Assumption (X-PDE) holds in a variety of different settings. Below, while not
aiming to give the sharpest possible conditions, we present some examples of such settings.
• Let O = Rd and assume that the operator L is uniformly parabolic: there exists γ > 0




iξj ≥ γ|ξ|2. (3.5)
Furthermore, suppose that the coefficients aij are bounded, uniformly Hölder contin-
uous in x and uniformly continuous in t, and the coefficients µi are Hölder contin-
uous in x uniformly on compacts and continuous in t. Then, by Theorem 4.4.6 in
(Friedman 1975), equation (3.4) admits a C1,2 solution, and the polynomial growth of
∂u
∂x
follows from the estimate (4.4.12) in the above reference.
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• Let O be a bounded domain with C1 boundary and assume that (3.5) is satisfied and
the coefficients aij and µi are uniformly Hölder continuous in (t, x) on [0, T ]×O. Then,
by Theorem 4.3.6 in (Friedman 1975) equation (3.4) admits a C1,2 solution.
• As our last example we consider a situation where the condition (3.5) need not be
satisfied. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the setting of homogeneous equations,
that is, the coefficients µ and σ do not depend on t, but the argument may be extended
to the general case. Suppose that the boundary of O is unattainable and that ∂xiµ,
∂2xixjµ, ∂xiσ and ∂
2
xixj
σ are bounded and locally Lipschitz. This ensures that equation








and, applying Theorem V.39 in (Protter 2004) twice (first to the process X and then
to its first order tangent flow), we conclude that the mapping x 7→ Xxt is twice con-








given by the solutions of the following system of equations (where we use the Einstein




















































Moreover, by standard arguments (e.g., Theorem V.66 in (Protter 2004) and Gronwall’s
































Then, by dominated convergence, the derivatives ∂tu, ∂xiu and ∂
2
xixj
u exist, are bounded,
continuous, and given by the following expressions.







































Furthermore, by the Markov property, for h ∈ (t, T ),






















where we removed the superscript (t, x) to save space. Dividing both sides by h − t
and passing to the limit h→ t, we get (3.4).
Lemma 3.3. Let Assumptions (X-SDE) and (X-PDE) be satisfied. Fix m∗0 ∈ P(O).
i. Let g : O 7→ R+ be a continuous function with polynomial growth. Then almost










g|| are bounded. Then, for m ∈ A(m∗0)








for some C > 0.
Proof. Part i. Assume that f and g are C∞ bounded positive functions with bounded





(t, x) = −g(x)f(t),













Taking the expectation and using the equation satisfied by u, the fact that ||∇Xu|| has polyno-
mial growth and the a priori estimates on the strong solution of the SDE (i.e. supt E[||Xt||p] <
∞, for all p ≥ 1), we get







which means that u is an admissible test function in the sense of Definition 3.1. Substituting


























t-almost everywhere on [0, T ]. The result may be extended to a positive continuous function
g with polynomial growth by considering a sequence of functions gl,n,m(x) := gl(x)φn,m(x),
where gl := ρl ?g converges uniformly on compact sets to g (see Prop. 4.21 in (Brezis 2010)),
φn,m := ρm?ψn converges pointwise to ψn, where (ρl)l≥1, (ρ
m)m≥1 are two sequences of molli-
fiers and ψn(x) := 1x∈Kn , with K
n a sequence of increasing compact sets approximating the
open set O (exhaustion by compact sets of the set O). Note that all elements of the sequence
of functions (gl,n,m)l,n,m admit bounded derivatives of all orders (since they are continuous
and have compact support). The result follows by applying first Lebesgue’s Theorem, when
taking the limit with respect to l and m and then the monotone convergence theorem when
letting n→∞.
Part ii. First remark that ∫
O
g(x)mt(dx),
is bounded on [0, T ]. This implies that it is enough to prove the result for ψ ∈ C∞([0, T ]),
because for ψ ∈ C1([0, T ]), the derivative ψ′ may be approximated by smooth functions in
the uniform norm.
By Itô formula, for s ≤ τ (t,x)O ,



















































= g(x)E[ψ(T ∧ τ (t,x)O )− ψ(t)] + E
[∫ T∧τ (t,x)O
t





















for some constant C < ∞, due to the bounds on g, ||∇Xg||, ||HXg||, ||µ|| and ||σ||. Then we
can define the function







which is an admissible test function by the same argument as the one used in the first part.











and since u(0, x) ≤ 2C‖ψ‖∞ for all x ∈ O, we get the statement of the lemma.
Corollary 3.4. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.3, let m∗0 ∈ P(O), and let m̄t(dx) be
the distribution of the process X started with initial distribution m∗0 and killed at the first
exit time from O. Then for every m ∈ A(m∗0), mt ≤ m̄t, dt-almost everywhere on [0, T ]. In
particular, if m̄t has a density then mt does as well.
Proof. Approximating the indicator function with a sequence of continuous bounded func-
tions and using the dominated convergence theorem, the first part of the above lemma yields







x(t, dz) = m̄t([a, b]),
where p̄x(t, dz) is the transition distribution of the process X killed at τxO.
In the following lemma we continue the study of the properties of the set A(m∗0). The
compactness of this set is established under the following assumption.
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Assumption 4 (m∗0-Compact). The initial distribution m
∗
0 ∈ P(O) satisfies∫
O
ln{1 + ||x||}m∗0(dx) <∞. (3.6)
Lemma 3.5. Let Assumptions (X-SDE) and (m∗0-Compact) be satisfied. Then the set
A(m∗0) is sequentially compact.
Proof. Let us first show the tightness of the associated set of measures on [0, T ] × O. For

































A(x) = 0, for all j 6= i, from which it is easy to see that φiA is twice continuously










φiA(x)x are bounded on O by a constant independent from A. In addition, as
A→∞, φiA(x) converges in a monotone fashion to the limiting function φi∗(x) = ln{1+|xi|3}.


































mt(dx) dt ≥ 0,
for m ∈ A(m∗0). From the boundedness of µ and σ and the above observations, we deduce
that the expression within the brackets in the last term is bounded uniformly on A. The












from which the tightness follows 2. Moreover, taking g = 1 in Lemma 3.3 we see thatA(m∗0) is
uniformly bounded. Therefore, by Prokhorov’s theorem (Theorem 8.6.2 in (Bogachev 2007)),
2For sake of clarity, we precise the tightness criteria. Let F be a topological space equipped with its
Borel sigma-field. Let (µi)i∈I be a flow of measures on (F,B(F )). If there exists a measurable function
φ : F 7→ [0,∞] with compact level sets such that C := supi∈I
∫
F
φ(x)dµi(x) <∞, then (µi)i∈I is tight (the
proof follows immediately by the measure version of the Markov inequality).
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from any sequence of flows of measures (mn)n≥1 ⊆ A(m∗0), one can extract a subsequence,
also denoted by (mn)n≥1, such that the sequence of associated measures on [0, T ] × O,
(µn)n≥1 converges weakly to a limiting measure µ
∗. By weak convergence, the measure µ∗












µ∗(dt, dx) ≥ 0.
Taking the test function u(t, x) =
∫ T
t











We conclude that µ∗ is a bounded measure and the measure
∫
O µ
∗(dt, dx) on [0, T ] is ab-
solutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, which means that we can write
µ∗(dt, dx) = m∗t (dx) dt for some m
∗ ∈ A(m∗0). The positivity of the limiting measure flow
follows from weak convergence and absolute continuity.
The following proposition is an existence result for the relaxed optimal stopping problem.
We need the following assumption on f .
Assumption 5 (f-Exist). One of the following alternative conditions holds true:




|f(t, x)|m̄t(dx) dt <∞,
where m̄t is the distribution at time t of the process X started with initial distribution
m∗0.





where n ≥ 1 and for each i, gi ∈ C2(O;R) is such that gi, ||∇Xgi|| and ||HXgi|| are
bounded., and f̄i is bounded measurable.
Proposition 3.6. Let Assumptions (X-SDE), (X-PDE), (m∗0-Compact) and (f -Exist) be







over all m ∈ A(m∗0).
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Proof. Choose a maximizing sequence of flows of measures (mn)n≥1⊆A(m∗0). By Lemma
3.5, it has a subsequence, also denoted by (mn)n≥1, which converges weakly to a limit m
∗ ∈
A(m∗0). To show that m∗ is a maximizer of (3.2), we consider separately the two alternative
assumptions of the proposition.
Suppose that Assumption i. holds true. Fix ε > 0. By the continuity of f and the





|f(t, x)|m̄t(dx) dt < ε.

























f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt. (3.7)
Since ε is arbitrary, mn is a maximizing sequence and m∗ ∈ A(m∗0), this finishes the proof.
Suppose now that Assumption ii. holds true instead. Without loss of generality it is
enough to consider the case where n = 1, and we omit the index i. Consider the mapping




t (dx). By Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.6
in (Ambrosio, Fusco & Pallara 2000), Gn is then of bounded variation on [0, T ]. Then, by
Theorem 3.23 in the above reference, up to taking a subsequence, we may assume that the
sequence of mappings (Gn)n≥1 converges in L
1([0, T ]) to some mapping G∗. On the other


























4 Relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping MFG
problem
We now give the definition of Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG optimal stopping prob-
lem. For the problem to be well-defined, we impose the following minimal assumption on
the reward function f :
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Assumption 6 (f-min-MFG). For every m ∈ A(m∗0), the map
(t, x) 7→ f(t, x,mt)





Definition 4.1. Given the initial distribution m∗0, a flow of measures m
∗ ∈ A(m∗0) is a Nash




















for all m ∈ A(m∗0).
In other words, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of fixed points of the




0) the family of sets over A(m∗0), defined
by







which is well defined whenever the function (t, x) 7→ f(t, x,mt) satisfies the conditions of
Proposition 3.6.
The next theorem estalishes existence of the MFG equilibrium under the following as-
sumption.












where, for each i, gi, ḡi ∈ C2(O;R) are such that gi, ḡi, ||∇Xgi||, ||∇X ḡi||, ||HXgi||, ||HX ḡi|| are
bounded, and f̄i is bounded measurable and continuous with respect to its second argument.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions (X-SDE), (X-PDE), (m∗0-Compact) and (f -Exist-MFG) be
satisfied. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG problem.
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Proof. We shall use the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem (Theorem 7.1 in (McLennan
2018)). We have seen that V is a locally convex space; moreover, the subset A(m∗0) ⊆ V
is compact (by Lemma 3.5 and since A(m∗0) is included in the space of positive and finite
measures on a separable metric space, which is metrizable), convex and nonempty. The
mapping Θ is clearly convex. Therefore, to prove that it has a fixed point it suffices to check
that it is upper semicontinuous. In other words, we check that it has a closed graph (see
Proposition 5.1.3 in (McLennan 2018)), where the graph is defined by
Gr(Θ) = {(m, m̄) ∈ (A(m∗0))2 : m ∈ Θ(m̄)}.
To show that Gr(Θ) is closed it suffices to check that for any two sequences (mn)n≥1 ⊆ A(m∗0)
and (m̄n)n≥1 ⊆ A(m∗0) which converge weakly to m ∈ A(m∗0) and m̄ ∈ A(m∗0) respectively,




f(t, x, m̄nt )m
n





f(t, x, m̄nt )m̂t(dx) dt,









f(t, x, m̄t)m̂t(dx) dt,










f(t, x, m̄nt )m
n











f(t, x, m̄nt )m̂t(dx) dt. (4.2)
We will only show that (4.1) holds true, since the convergence given by (4.2) follows by the
same arguments. It is enough to consider the case K = 1 and we drop the index i. We
therefore need to prove∫ T
0




f̄(t, ḡ ∗ m̄nt ) g ∗mnt dt, (4.3)
where we write g ∗m as a shorthand for
∫
O g(x)m(dx). As in the proof of Proposition 3.6,
we may show that ḡ ∗m̄n converges to ḡ ∗m̄ in L1([0, T ]). Similarly, we may show that g ∗mn
converges to g ∗m in L1([0, T ]). Since f is continuous, f̄(t, ḡ ∗ m̄nt ) g ∗mnt converges almost
everywhere to f̄(t, ḡ ∗ m̄t) g ∗mt. Further, by Corollary 3.4, g ∗mnt is uniformly bounded,
and (4.3) follows from the dominated convergence theorem.
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Uniqueness of the Nash value for the relaxed MFG problem We prove here the
uniqueness result of the Nash equilibrium value for the relaxed problem, which holds under
the following assumption on the map f .
Assumption 8 (f-Uniq-MFG). The function f takes the following form












g|| are bounded., h : [0, T ] × O 7→ R is
continuous, with polynomial growth in x and f̄ : [0, T ] × R 7→ R is bounded measurable,
continuous and decreasing in the second argument.
Remark 4.3. Note that under Assumption (f -Uniq-MFG), the function f satisfies for each
t and all m1 ∈ A(m∗0) and m2 ∈ A(m∗0) the following antimonotonicity condition∫
O
(




= (f̄(t, g ∗m1t )− f̄(t, g ∗m2t ))(g ∗m1t − g ∗m2t ) ≤ 0.
Theorem 4.4 (Uniqueness of the Nash value). Let m∗ and m̄ be two Nash equilibria
for the relaxed problem and let Assumption (f -Uniq-MFG) be satisfied. Then,
f̄(t, g ∗m∗t ) = f̄(t, g ∗ m̄t),
almost everywhere on [0, T ], and in particular they lead to the same value of the relaxed









O f(t, x, m̄)m̄t(dx).
























(f(t, x, m̄)− f(t, x,m∗))(m̄t(dx)−m∗t (dx))dt ≥ 0.
The antimonotonicity property of the map f then implies that∫
O
(f(t, x, m̄)− f(t, x,m∗))(m̄t(dx)−m∗t (dx)) = 0,
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almost everywhere on [0, T ], or in other words that
(f̄(t, g ∗m1t )− f̄(t, g ∗m2t ))(g ∗m1t − g ∗m2t ) = 0,
almost everywhere on [0, T ], which implies that
f̄(t, g ∗m1t ) = f̄(t, g ∗m2t ),
almost everywhere on [0, T ]. Integrating over [0, T ]×O we see that the two equilibria lead
to the same value.
Remark 4.5. A natural question is to see if one can use a relaxed Nash equilibrium corre-
sponding to the MFG game problem in order to construct a ε-Nash equilibria for the N -player







δXit (dx)1t≤τ i∧τ iO , (4.4)











This problem is left for further research.
5 Relation between the relaxed and the strong formu-
lation of the single-agent optimal stopping and of the
MFG problem and relation with mixed solutions
In this section we provide the relation between the relaxed and the strong formulation of the
single-agent optimal stopping problem and of the MFG problem, as well as with the mixed
solutions introduced in (Bertucci 2017). We make here the following additional assumption.
Assumption 9 (X-Reg).
i. The domain O is an open bounded domain of Rd, with boundary Γ := ∂O of class C2
and the process X· started with initial distribution m
∗
0 and killed at the first exit time of
O has a distribution m̄t, which, for each t, has a square integrable density with respect
to the Lebesgue measure.
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ii. σ satisfies the uniform ellipticity condition.
Remark 5.1. Let O be as in Assumption (X-Reg), assume that σ satisfies the uniform
ellipticity condition, that the coefficients a = σ>σ and µ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous
on [0, T ]×O and that the initial distribution m∗0 admits a bounded density with respect to
the Lebesgue measure. Then, by Theorem 3.16 in (Friedman 1983), the operator L admits
a Green function G(x, t; ξ, T ), which is continuous in ξ for all T > t. Moreover, the Green
function admits an Aronson-type estimate of the form







see Equation (16.16) in (Ladyzhenskaya, Solonnikov & Uraltseva 1968). This means that
the solution u to the equation
∂u
∂t
+ Lu = 0




G(x, t; ξ, T )φ(ξ)dξ.
On the other hand, by Theorem 5.2 in (Friedman 1975), this solution is given by
u(t, x) = E[φ(X(t,x)T )1τxO>T ].
We conclude that the Green function coincides with the density of the process started at
(t, x) and killed at the first exist time from O. The density of the process started with the




m∗0(x)G(x, 0; ξ, T )dx.
Since m∗0 is bounded by assumption, we conclude using the bound (5.1) that the density
m̄t(ξ) is uniformly bounded on [0, T ]. Note that the process satisfying the conditions given
in this remark also satisfies the assumptions (X-SDE) and (X-PDE) (see Remark 3.2).
Note that, by Corollary 3.4, we derive that mt admits a square integrable density with
respect to the Lebesgue measure, for each m ∈ A(m∗0) and for a.e. t ∈ (0, T ].
Let W be a standard K-dimensional Brownian motion and X0 be a random variable
with distribution m∗0, independent from W . We suppose that X0 is valued in O and that m∗0
admits a square integrable density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the sequel, we
denote by F the filtration given by Ft = σ(Ws, 0 ≤ s ≤ t) ∨ σ(X0) ∨ N , where N denotes
the sets of zero measure. Moreover, T ([t, T ]) denotes the set of stopping times with respect
to this filtration with values in [t, T ]. We also denote by T tW ([t, T ]) the set of stopping times
with respect to the (completed) filtration generated by the translated Brownian motion
W ts := Ws −Wt, s ≥ t, with values in [t, T ].
We address first the case of the single-agent optimal stopping problem.
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Theorem 5.2. [Single-Agent optimal stopping problem] Let Assumptions (X-SDE),
(X-PDE), (X-Reg) and (f -Exist)(ii) be satisfied. Let v be the value function of the following
optimal stopping problem
v(t, x) = sup







with (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and τ (t,x)O := inf{s ≥ t : X
(t,x)











ii. Let x ∈ O and define τ̄x := inf{0 ≤ s ≤ T : v(s,Xxs ) = 0}. Then the measure m∗ given




0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A, t < τ̄x] for all A ∈ B(O) is a maximizer of the map









O f(s, x)ms(dx)ds. Then it satisfies:
a.
∫
S f(t, x)m̄t(dx)dt = 0, with S := {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v(t, x) = 0}.













φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0. (5.3)
Proof. Part i. By Theorem 4.7, Chapter 3, in (Bensoussan & Lions 1982), the value function
defined by (5.2) is a solution belonging to W 2,1,2(Q), with Q := (0, T )×O 3, which satisfies





(t, x)− Lv(t, x)− f(t, x), v(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ (0, T )×O,
v(t, x) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ), x ∈ ∂O,
v(T, x) = 0, x ∈ O. (5.4)
First note that, by Lemma A.1, we have








3The Sobolev space W 2,1,2(Q) represents the set of functions u such that ∂tu, ∂xiu, ∂xixju ∈ L2(Q), with
i, j = 1, d, where the derivatives are understood in the sense of distributions.
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By classical results on optimal stopping and associated reflected Backward SDEs with ran-
dom terminal time T ∧ τX0O (see e.g. Proposition 2.3 in (El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux,
Peng, Quenez et al. 1997)), we get







τ̄X0 := inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T : v(t,XX0t ) = 0}. (5.7)
Note that, by definition of the value function v, we have τ̄X0 ≤ τX0O ∧ T a.s.
Taking now the expectation in (5.6), we derive that






Remark that the occupational measure associated with the diffusion process X· killed at




0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A, t < τ̄x], belongs to A(m∗0).
Therefore, we have ∫
O







We now show the converse inequality. Fix m ∈ A(m∗0). Using a classical method of
regularisation by convolution with a standard mollifier, with respect to both time and space
(see, e.g., an extension of Meyers-Serrin’s result - Theorem 3, p. 252, in (Evans 1998)), the
value function v can be approximated by a sequence of functions ϕn ∈ C∞([0, T ] × O,R+)
such that ϕn → v in W 2,1,2(Q) ∩ C([0, T ], L2(O)) as n → ∞ and ∂tϕn + Lϕn is bounded.
Since (ϕn)n≥1 are admissible test functions, they verify the constraint (3.3). Therefore, using












mt(dx)dt ≥ 0. (5.8)
From the above inequality, we derive that∫
O











Since v satisfies the variational inequality (5.4) and due to the positivity ofm and Assumption


















Combining the two above relations and by arbitrariness of m ∈ A(m∗0), we get∫
O







Part ii. Since the stopping time τ̄X0 given by (5.7) is optimal for the stopping problem







f(t, x)m∗t (dx)dt, (5.10)




0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A, t < τ̄x] for all A ∈ B(O).
Using part i. and the fact that m∗ ∈ A(m∗0), the result follows.



















































where the last relation follows since v satisfies the variational inequality (5.4). Now, since
−∂v
∂t





































Using the above relation, the inequality (5.9) and the fact that f ≤ 0 a.e. on {v = 0}, we
finally obtain that ∫
v=0













v(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0. (5.11)
24












φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0,
for all C∞c functions φ such that suppφ⊆{(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}.
First note that, by the same approximation procedure as the one used for the value
function v in Part i. (using an extension of Meyers-Serrin’s result), any non-negative function
u in W 2,1,2(Q) satisfies the constraint (5.8).
Let φ be a C∞c non-negative function such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × O : v > 0}.












φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) > 0. (5.12)












(v − φ)(0, x)m∗0(dx) < 0,
Since v − φ is a non-negative function belonging to W 2,1,2(Q), we get a contradiction. This
implies that for all non-negative C∞c functions φ such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × O :












φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0.
The result can be extended to an arbitrary C∞c function φ (which also takes negative values)
such that suppφ ⊆ {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v > 0}. Using appropriate scaling factors and simi-





























0(dx) > 0 cannot be satisfied. Hence, for all












φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0. (5.13)
We now illustrate the relation between the relaxed and strong formulation of the op-
timization problem in the MFG context, as well as the relation with the mixed solutions
introduced in (Bertucci 2017).
Theorem 5.3. [MFG optimal stopping problem] Let Assumptions (X-SDE), (X-PDE),
(X-Reg) and (f -Exist-MFG) be satisfied. Let m∗ be a Nash equilibrium of the relaxed MFG
problem and let v be the value function of the optimal stopping problem
v(t, x) = sup


































t (dx)dt = 0, with S := {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×O : v(t, x) = 0}.













φ(0, x)m∗0(dx) = 0.
Proof. The proof follows by using the results obtained in Theorem 5.2 applied to the instan-
taneous reward function f(·,m∗) (which satisfies Assumption (f -Exist)(ii), so that Theorem
5.2 can be applied), together with the Nash equilibrium property of m∗.
Remark 5.4. It follows from the variational inequality (5.4) that f ≤ 0 on {v = 0}.




t (dx) dt = 0. Such a solution is called a pure
solution in (Bertucci 2017), meaning that the agent will exit the game immediately upon
entering the exercise region.
6 Fixed-point algorithm and convergence in the case
of potential games
We first show that, in the case of potential games, the search for MFG equilibrium reduces
to the maximization of a functional. The reward function of a potential game satisfied the
following assumption.




f̄i (t, gi ∗mt) gi(x),
where for each i, f̄i is bounded, measurable in t, and continuous and decreasing in the second
argument, and gi ∈ C2(O;R) such that gi, ||∇Xgi|| and ||HXgi|| are bounded. Moreover, for
each i, there exists F i : [0, T ]×R 7→ R such that ∂xF i(t, x) = f̄i(t, x) and F i(·, 0) ∈ L1([0, T ]).
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Proposition 6.1. Let Assumption (f -Pot) be satisfied. Then m∗ ∈ A(m∗0) is a Nash
equilibrium of the relaxed optimal stopping problem if and only if









F i(t, g ∗mt)dt,




∂xF i(t, g ∗m∗t )(g ∗mt − g ∗m∗t )dt ≤ 0.
Since f̄i is decreasing in the second argument, F̄i is concave in the second argument, and by
concavity this implies that F (m∗) ≥ F (m). Conversely, assume that m∗ is a maximizer of














∂xF i(t, ξt)g ∗ (m∗t −mt)dt ≥ 0,
where ξt ∈ [g ∗m∗t , αg ∗mt + (1− α)g ∗m∗t ]. Making α tend to 0 and using the dominated





f̄i(t, g ∗m∗t )g ∗ (m∗t −mt)dt ≥ 0.
We propose now a fixed-point algorithm for potential games. We use the notations of
Proposition 6.1.
Algorithm
• Fix m0 ∈ A(m∗0);
• For k = 0 to N
• Compute uk the solution of the obstacle problem (5.4) associated with f(·,mk);
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0(dx)P[Xxt ∈ A; t < τxk ], for all
A ∈ B(O), where τxk := inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T : uk(t,Xxt ) = 0}4;
• Let ρk be a maximizer of ρ 7→ F (mk + ρ(m̃k −mk));
• Set mk+1 := mk + ρk(m̃k −mk);
• Set k ← k + 1.
In the above algorithm, N represents the number of iterations.
For each m ∈ A(m∗0), define
C(m) :=
{









ρ̂ ∈ arg max
ρ∈[0,1]
F (m+ ρ(m∗ −m))
}
.
Lemma 6.2. Let Assumptions (X-SDE), (X-PDE), (X-Reg) and (f -Pot) be satisfied. The
set-valued map m ∈ A(m∗0) 7→ C(m) has a closed graph and m̄ ∈ A(m∗0) is a relaxed Nash
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies m̄ ∈ C(m̄).
Proof. Let (mn)n≥1 ∈ A(m∗0) be a sequence converging weakly to some m̂ ∈ A(m∗0) and
m̄n = mn+ ρ̂n(mn
∗−mn) such that m̄n ∈ C(mn) weakly converging to some m̄. Let us prove
that m̄ ∈ C(m̂). Taking subsequences if necessary, we can assume that ρ̂n converges to some
ρ̂ ∈ [0, 1] and mn∗ weakly converges to some m∗.
Since mn
∗


















for all m ∈ A(m∗0). For simplicity, we consider here the case K = 1 and drop the index i.
Using the same arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we may say that, up to
taking subsequences, the sequence (g ∗mn)n≥1 (resp. (g ∗mn
∗
)n≥1) converges in L
1([0, T ])
to g ∗ m̂ (resp. g ∗ m∗). Due to the continuity of f̄ , we derive that f̄(t, g ∗ mnt )g ∗ mn
∗
t
(resp. f̄(t, g ∗mnt )g ∗mt) converges for a.e. t to f̄(t, g ∗ m̂t)g ∗m∗t (resp. f̄(t, g ∗ m̂t)g ∗mt).
By Corollary 3.4, g ∗mn∗ is uniformly bounded, therefore, by appealing to the dominated












for all m ∈ A(m∗0), that is







4Note that, for each k from 0 to N , we extend uk such that uk(t, x) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x /∈ O.
Therefore, we have τxk ≤ τxO ∧ T a.s.
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Now it remains to show that ρ̂ is a maximizer of ρ 7→ F (m̂ + ρ(m∗ − m̂)). For each n, we
have F (mn + ρ̂n(mn
∗ −mn)) ≥ F (mn + ρ(mn∗ −mn)), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], for all n. Taking the
limit n→∞ and using similar arguments as above, as well as the assumptions on F , we get
F (m̂+ ρ̂(m∗ − m̂)) ≥ F (m̂+ ρ(m∗ − m̂)), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
To conclude, we have m̄ ∈ C(m̂).
It is clear that, if m ∈ A(m∗0) is a relaxed Nash equilibrium, then it satisfies m ∈
C(m). Conversely, one can show that if m ∈ C(m), then m corresponds to a relaxed


















t (dx) − mt(dx))dt = 0, which implies
that m corresponds to a relaxed Nash equilibrium. If m∗ = m, the conclusion is clear.
We now give the following convergence result.
Theorem 6.3. Let Assumptions (X-SDE), (X-PDE) , (X-Reg) and (f -Pot) be satisfied.
Then the cluster points of the sequence (mn)n≥1 generated by the previous algorithm belong
to the set of relaxed Nash equilibria and the sequence (un(0, x))n≥1 converges for all x ∈ O
to ū(0, x), the value function of the obstacle problem associated with cost functional f(·, m̄),
where m̄ is a relaxed Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First note that, by using the definition of m̃n and Theorem 5.2 part ii., we get that









t(dx)dt. We thus have m
n+1 ∈ C(mn), for all n.
Let (mkn)n≥1 be a sequence converging weakly to some m, and taking a subsequence
again if necessary, we may also assume that mkn+1 converges to some m1. As by the previous
theorem the set-valued map m ∈ A(m∗0) 7→ C(m) has a closed graph, we have m1 ∈ C(m),
that ism1 = m+ρ̂(m











Now, since the sequence (F (mn))n≥1 is increasing, one has F (m) = F (m1). Assume now












t (dx) − mt(dx))dt > 0. Moreover, using Lemma 6.2, we have m /∈ C(m)
which implies that ρ̂ > 0. Hence, we conclude that F (m1) = F (m + ρ̂(m
∗ −m)) > F (m),
which represents a contradiction.
Let us now prove the convergence of the sequence (un(0, x))n≥1 for all x ∈ O.
Since all Nash equilibria m lead to the same value (see Theorem 4.4), we can define
ū as being the solution of the obstacle problem associated with f(·, m̄), with m̄ a Nash
equilibrium.
Let ukn be a given subsequence. Up to subtracting a subsequence again, one can assume
that mkn converges weakly to some m∗ ∈ A(m∗0), which, by the results above, is a relaxed
Nash equilibrium.
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Fix x ∈ O. We have:
|ukn(0, x)− ū(0, x)| ≤ sup








∣∣f(s,Xxs ,mkns )− f(s,Xxs ,m∗s)∣∣ ds] .
Using again the convergence in L1([0, T ]) of g ∗mkn to g ∗m∗, the assumptions on f together
with Lebesgue Theorem, we get that the last term of the above inequality converges to 0. We
can conclude that from every subsequence of ukn(0, x), we can extract a further subsequence
which converges to ū(0, x). The result follows.
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A Appendix
We show here that the representation (5.2) remains true when the initial condition ξ is
random. More precisely, we have the following result.
Lemma A.1. Let ξ ∈ L2(O,F0). Then we have








Proof. The proof is based on quite classical arguments and we give it here for the reader’s
convenience. Let us first consider a simple random variable ξn ∈ L2(O,F0), being such that




























1Aiv(0, xi) = v(0, ξ
n) a.s.
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Now, in the general case, we approximate ξ by a sequence of simple random variables ξn of
the form given by (A.2). The continuity of v with respect to x implies that
v(0, ξn)→v(0, ξ) a.s. as n→∞. (A.3)










































O a.s. as n→∞ due to the continuity property of
the first passage time for elliptic diffusions (see Proposition 4.4. in (Pardoux 1998)). Using
the continuity property of the solution of the SDE with respect to the initial condition,








a.s as n→∞. (A.4)
By (A.3) and (A.4) and the uniqueness of the limit, we get (A.1).
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Rendus Mathématique 343(9), 619–625.
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